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Abstract
Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the
political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic. These studies have
focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how
trade affects an individual's income. The factor endowments or Heckscher-Ohlin model posits that these
preferences are affected primarily by a person's skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that
trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works. We find little support for either of these
models using two representative national surveys of Americans. The only potential exception involves the
effects of education. Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly
related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, further analysis
reveals that education's effects are less representative of skill than of individuals' anxieties about involvement
with out-groups in their own country and beyond. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes
are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U.S. economy as a whole is affected by
trade.
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Abstract Although it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass atti-
tudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a
handful of studies have addressed this topic+ These studies have focused largely on
testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by
how trade affects an individual’s income+ The factor endowments or Heckscher-
Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person’s skills+
The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on
the industry in which a person works+ We find little support for either of these mod-
els using two representative national surveys of Americans+ The only potential excep-
tion involves the effects of education+ Initial tests indicate that educational attainment
and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support
for the Heckscher-Ohlin model+ However, further analysis reveals that education’s
effects are less representative of skill than of individuals’ anxieties about involve-
ment with out-groups in their own country and beyond+ Furthermore, we find strong
evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by percep-
tions of how the U+S+ economy as a whole is affected by trade+
The politics of international trade has been a long-standing puzzle for social sci-
entists+ Among economists, there is widespread agreement that free trade is ben-
eficial+1 Open trade and cross-national market integration help to allocate factors
of production efficiently and to promote the welfare of countries and the world as
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Philadelphia; seminars at the University of Chicago ~Harris School!, Emory Uni-
versity, Harvard University, and the University of Virginia; and a conference on Domestic Preferences
and Foreign Economic Policy, held at Princeton University+We are grateful to Marc Busch, Jens Hain-
mueller, So Young Kim, Richard Valelly, the editors of International Organization, and two anony-
mous reviewers for helpful comments; to Rumi Morishima, Matthew Tubin, and Carmela Aquino for
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a whole+ Historically, however, open trade has been the exception rather than the
rule+
Studies of the political economy of trade often attribute variations in trade pref-
erences to the distributional implications of overseas commerce+ Despite the eco-
nomic benefits that a given country would accrue from open trade, some individuals
suffer economic harm as a result+ If these individuals form a politically potent
constituency, they may be able to pressure policymakers to increase trade barriers
even if doing so is economically counterproductive for the country as a whole+ If,
on the other hand, the individuals who derive welfare gains from trade are partic-
ularly influential, then an open trade regime is likely to take hold+ Recent research
indicates that, in democratic countries, constituency opinion on trade plays a cen-
tral role in influencing the policy positions of public officials+2
There are two principle ways of assessing the distributional consequences of
trade+ First, the factor endowments approach emphasizes that, in a given country,
trade benefits those individuals who own factors of production that are in abun-
dant supply relative to the remainder of the world, and harms owners of factors
that are in scarce supply+ In countries such as the United States, which has a skilled
labor force, free trade benefits highly skilled workers and harms less skilled work-
ers+ Second, the specific factors approach predicts that an individual’s attitudes
toward trade will reflect characteristics of the industry in which he or she works+
People employed in industries that depend on overseas markets should be more
supportive of open trade than people working in industries that face considerable
competition from imports+
A small but growing number of studies have evaluated the strength of these
explanations for trade policy preferences+ We extend this body of research using
two representative national surveys of Americans and more comprehensive mea-
sures of industries and occupations than previous studies had available to them+ In
addition, we link the study of trade preferences to the more extensive body of
theory and empirical research on how self-interest enters into the formation of
domestic economic policy preferences+
Substantial research in other economic policy domains has demonstrated that
self-interest rarely shapes the formation of policy opinions because people have a
difficult time understanding the connection between personal economic well-
being and government policy+ By mounting the most thorough individual-level
examination to date of the effects of industry and skill on individual trade prefer-
ences, we seek to determine whether trade is, indeed, one of those rare exceptions
in which personal experiences are successfully politicized+ Alternatively, if atti-
tudes about trade are formed in a manner similar to attitudes about domestic eco-
nomic domains such as unemployment, then trade policy preferences will be based
on how people believe a policy affects the country collectively rather than on nar-
rowly defined self-interest+ Importantly, the analysis of aggregate-level data—the
2+ See Fordham and McKeown 2003; and Kono 2008+
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approach used by most previous studies of trade preferences—cannot differentiate
between these two possibilities+ Thus, uniquely, this study simultaneously exam-
ines both how personal economic self-interest and perceptions of the collective
national interest influence trade preferences+
Our findings indicate that accounting for perceptions of how the U+S+ economy
is affected by trade is important to modeling trade preferences+ Consistent with
previous research on the impact of self-interest on policy attitudes, our data show
little support for either the factor endowments or the specific factors model+ By
contrast, perceptions of how trade affects the country as a whole—what are often
referred to as “sociotropic” perceptions—play a substantial role in shaping atti-
tudes about foreign commerce, a role that is largely independent of self-interest+
Indeed, these perceptions are among the most important influences on opinions
about trade+
Finally, we further improve our understanding of mass trade preferences by incor-
porating into our model indicators of domestic ethnocentrism and foreign policy
attitudes+ There is little support for free trade among people who believe the United
States should take an isolationist stance on international affairs more generally or
those who feel that members of other ethnic and racial groups are less praisewor-
thy than their own racial or ethnic group+ Although such views have no direct
bearing on the economic benefits of trade, they are far more predictive of trade
preferences than indicators of economic self-interest+
Taken as a whole, the results of this article cast doubt on the ability of standard
political economy models to explain trade preferences+ Furthermore, the fact that
sociotropic perceptions and out-group anxiety are such powerful predictors of these
preferences indicates that research on trade policy would benefit by developing
psychologically based models that address how individuals process information
about the economy, and how they form attitudes about people and places beyond
their borders+
The Origins of Trade Preferences
Much of the existing research on trade preferences has been guided by two mod-
els+ The factor endowments, or Heckscher-Ohlin, model assumes that all factors of
production within a country are mobile across sectors, that markets are perfectly
competitive, and that there are constant returns to scale in production+ Based on these
assumptions, Stolper and Samuelson showed that, in a given country, open trade
benefits owners of factors of production that are abundant, relative to the remain-
der of the world, and harms owners of scarce factors+3 Consequently, in the United
States—a country endowed with an abundance of highly skilled and well-educated
labor relative to the rest of the world—free trade benefits highly skilled workers
3+ Stolper and Samuelson 1941+
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and damages less-skilled individuals+4 Open trade increases the demand for skilled
workers, since the United States has a comparative advantage in the production of
goods that use this input intensively+ As the demand for such workers rises, so do
their wages+ Conversely, heightened trade decreases the demand for low-skilled labor
in the United States and depresses its wage rate since goods produced using such
labor intensively can be produced more efficiently abroad+5 The factor endow-
ments approach therefore predicts that highly skilled workers in the United States
should be protrade, whereas other workers should hold more protectionist views+
Empirical studies of trade policy attitudes have generated a fair amount of sup-
port for this theory+ In a set of cross-national analyses, O’Rourke and Sinnott and
Mayda and Rodrik find that mass opinion about trade corresponds closely to pre-
dictions stemming from the factor endowments approach+6 Scheve and Slaughter
provide some additional support for this approach, based on an analysis of public
attitudes in the United States; and Balistreri concludes that this model helps to
explain Canadian attitudes toward the Canadian–U+S+ Free Trade Agreement+7 None-
theless, a number of recent studies have raised questions about the fit between
trade preferences and the factor endowments model+8 A key assumption in the
Heckscher-Ohlin model is that factors of production can move quickly and easily
from one sector to another+ In the long run, this assumption is not difficult to jus-
tify+ In the short run, however, it can be difficult for people ~not to mention other
factors of production! to change the sector in which they are employed+9
The specific factors, or Ricardo-Viner, model is an alternative framework that
assumes that, at least in the short run, certain factors of production cannot be shifted
across sectors+ If workers cannot easily move from one sector to another, then
they will base their trade preferences on how changes in trade policy are expected
to affect the industry in which they are currently employed+ This model suggests
that individuals who work in export-oriented sectors of the economy will support
open trade because they personally benefit from it, while those in import-competing
sectors will be more protectionist+ Equally, an individual employed in a nontraded
sector of the economy should be more protrade than someone employed in an
industry that faces substantial competition from foreign imports+
Few studies have tried to evaluate whether trade preferences correspond to the
specific factors model, primarily due to a lack of data on individuals’ industry of
4+ Leamer 1984+
5+ The human capital model makes similar predictions about the attitudes of highly skilled workers
in countries with a highly skilled labor force+ In this model, however, the reason highly skilled work-
ers should support open trade is that they can more easily shift occupations and industries, and thus
adapt successfully to economic change+ See Gabel 1998; Baker 2003 and 2005; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny,
and Ceccoli 2004; and Kocher and Minushkin 2006+
6+ See O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+
7+ See Balistreri 1997; and Scheve and Slaughter 2001+
8+ See Baker 2003; and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+
9+ The model may still prove useful if citizens use a relatively long time frame to evaluate the
impact of trade policies+ On this point, see Mayda and Rodrik 2005+
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employment in most extant surveys+ Mayda and Rodrik try to infer respondents’
industry from occupational data; but this is an imperfect solution, with many indi-
viduals assigned to multiple overlapping sectors because of inadequate informa-
tion+10 Nonetheless, Mayda and Rodrik find evidence that is broadly consistent
with the specific factors model+ In a similarly motivated analysis, Scheve and
Slaughter compare the factor endowments and specific factors models, using edu-
cational attainment and the average yearly earnings for the respondent’s occupa-
tion as indicators of skill, and the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the
respondent’s industry of employment as specific factors indicators+11 Their study
provides evidence for the factor endowments model, but none supportive of the
specific factors model+
Notably, the underlying premise in both models described above is that atti-
tudes toward trade are largely a function of who is personally helped or hurt by
trade policies+As Mayda and Rodrik note, “to the extent that individuals are moti-
vated by material self-interest, these models provide important hints about an
individual’s likely attitudes toward trade depending upon his0her factor type or
sector of employment+”12 Unfortunately, the explanatory value of these models
has been quite limited to date, and even simple demographics often explain more
about trade preferences than variables linked to either model+
Beyond these two dominant theoretical frameworks, existing studies have also
produced a set of empirical findings that remain in need of a theoretical frame-
work+ For example, Mayda and Rodrik find that social status, relative incomes,
and values play a more important role than variables highlighted by either eco-
nomic model+13 Upper-class people are more likely to be protrade as are those
with higher relative incomes+ In addition, older people appear to be more protec-
tionist than younger generations+
In the same vein, although educational attainment tends to be highly correlated
with support for trade, the appropriate interpretation of this relationship remains
unclear+14 If education is simply serving as a proxy for skill level, then this rela-
tionship can be interpreted as support for the factor endowments model+ This, in
fact, is how these results are typically viewed+
But there are many other plausible explanations for why education might relate
to trade preferences+ Well-educated people are different from their less-educated
counterparts in numerous ways, including levels of tolerance for out-groups ~such
as foreigners!, risk preferences, levels of dogmatism, and preferences for immedi-
ate versus delayed gratification+ To the extent that trade preferences are driven by
10+ Ibid+
11+ Scheve and Slaughter 2001+
12+ Mayda and Rodrik 2005, 1394+
13+ Mayda and Rodrik 2005+
14+ For studies that have found such a correlation, see Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, chap+ 6; Scheve
and Slaughter 2001; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004; and Mayda
and Rodrik 2005+
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characteristics such as ethnocentricism, out-group hostility, or isolationist foreign
policy tendencies, education’s influence may have little to do with economic
self-interest+
Hainmueller and Hiscox argue that education represents something other than skill
level+15 They find that the effect of education on trade preferences is much the same
for Americans who are not currently employed as for those who are working+
Equally, there is no distinguishable difference in the effects of education between
working individuals and retirees, a subset of nonworking individuals who are
unlikely to re-enter the labor force+ In their view, the fact that education’s impact is
not contingent on whether an individual is receiving wages for using his or her skills
casts doubt on the factor endowments model+ Rather than serving as a proxy for
skill, they argue that education represents the effects of exposure to economic ideas
among the college-educated+ Because mainstream economists generally favor open
trade, college-educated individuals will have more exposure to arguments about the
economic benefits of foreign commerce than those with less formal education+
This claim is consistent with Hainmueller and Hiscox’s findings that college-
educated individuals have especially protrade attitudes, but these individuals are
distinctive from their less educated counterparts in many other ways as well+ As
Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry point out, education is a powerful predictor of many
civic virtues+16 Unfortunately, it is poorly understood why education is linked to
these outcomes+ Empirical research suggests that education affects political pref-
erences in at least two ways: ~1! through occupational prominence and position in
social networks, and ~2! through cognitive proficiency and analytical ability+17 If
education serves as a proxy for skill level, then it falls into the first of these cat-
egories+ Under these circumstances, education influences trade preferences because
of where schooling locates people in socioeconomic strata+ But since education
also contributes to tolerance of different cultures and countries, as well as a belief
on the part of Americans that the United States should be more actively engaged
in foreign affairs, it remains to be seen if exposure to arguments about the virtues
of international trade is driving Hainmueller and Hiscox’s results+18
Furthermore, the expected trade attitudes of retirees are far from clear+ That
education’s impact on such attitudes is indistinguishable between workers and retir-
ees could reflect a tendency for trade preferences to persist over the course of a
lifetime, rather than changing suddenly at retirement+ Thus, based on this analysis
alone, it is difficult to determine whether skill level influences the formation of
trade preferences+
The common finding that women are more protectionist than men, even after
controlling for educational differences, also has been attributed to a college edu-
15+ Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+
16+ Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996+
17+ Ibid+
18+ See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, chap+ 6; Erikson and Tedin 2005; and Fordham 2008+
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cation, in this case to differences in the kinds of courses taken by men and women+
Burgoon and Hiscox, for example, maintain that college-educated men are more
likely than college-educated women to be exposed to mainstream economic argu-
ments about the gains from trade+ They argue that the gender gap in trade policy
attitudes stems from the fact that protrade ideas reach more men than women
through their college coursework+19
More generally, Burgoon and Hiscox and Hainmueller and Hiscox make the
important point that the kind of information to which citizens are exposed is likely
to play a crucial role in shaping trade preferences+20 To extend their argument beyond
the educational environment, it is easy to see how if a person is a union member,
they will be exposed to a different kind of information about the impact of free trade
policies than a nonunion worker+ As new concerns about globalization arise, orga-
nizations regularly communicate with their members to encourage certain policy
preferences and to inform them about how they think people will be affected by
particular policies+ Likewise,members of the retiree organization AARP may receive
regular information about the perils of financial insecurity in today’s global econ-
omy, thus cultivating the impression of risk and volatility that could drive percep-
tions of the need for protectionist policies+ Particularly in the current highly
specialized media environment, different people receive different information+21
Whether this information variability is an outgrowth of the college courses they
took, of newsletters, or of the daily newspaper, it helps shape perceptions that
may or may not have a basis in the individual’s personal economic reality+ We
refer to this collection of models emphasizing information differences as a source
of variance in trade preferences as information-based models+
Intuitively, information of the kind one might be exposed to in college or in a
daily newspaper would seem to pale in comparison to the hard reality of eco-
nomic risk faced by a worker in a given occupation or industry+ Surely threats to
one’s livelihood would seem to be a more potent influence on policy preferences+
Surprisingly, the literature on economic policy preferences suggests that self-
interest is unlikely to play an influential role in shaping attitudes toward free trade+22
A large body of research demonstrates that self-interest enters into the formation
of policy opinions only under very special and rare circumstances+23
Because of the counterintuitive nature of this claim, social scientists have
searched extensively for instances in which economic self-interest played a signif-
icant role in the formation of policy preferences, but with little success+ Evidence
suggests that the economic impact of policies on individual families has little, if
any, influence on their policy preferences+24 The lack of self-interested policy pref-
19+ Burgoon and Hiscox 2004+
20+ See Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+
21+ Prior 2007+
22+ For a review of this literature, see Kiewiet 1983+
23+ Sears and Funk 1990+
24+ Ibid+
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erences occurs not out of a mass tendency toward altruism, but rather because
citizens have a difficult time linking their personal economic situations to public
policies+ Furthermore, this pattern is not restricted to the economic realm+ The list
of failed attempts to observe the influence of self-interest in the formation of pol-
icy preferences is by now quite lengthy+25 Exceptions to this general rule have
received a great deal of attention, if only because of their rarity+26
But this is not to say that economic conditions are unrelated to policy prefer-
ences+ Instead, because people tend to formulate policy preferences on the basis
of collective, national-level information ~that is, perceptions of how a given pol-
icy has affected the nation as a whole!, economic conditions can influence these
preferences, but through a fundamentally different process than what has been sug-
gested by theories emphasizing self-interest+ Even something as personally jarring
as losing a job has far less impact on political preferences than the perception that
unemployment is worsening as a collective, national problem+27 Thus, to the extent
that trade preferences are similar to attitudes toward other aspects of economic
policy, they will stem from people’s perceptions of the collective impact that trade
policy has on the nation+ This pattern has been dubbed sociotropic influence because
of the tendency it suggests for relying on collective-level information rather than
personal experience+28
Sociotropic models are, at root, information-based explanations+ They are rooted
in people’s perceptions ~or misperceptions! derived from any number of sources
of information, beyond personal life experience+ Most interestingly, such percep-
tions are not mere generalizations from personal experience+ The two kinds of
information that have been found to influence national-level collective percep-
tions are: ~1! local information, such as information about the local economy, and
~2! mass media coverage of economic issues+ Citizens tend to process personal-
level experiences and concerns in a fashion that compartmentalizes them from the
political world+29 Collective-level information, on the other hand, is more easily
linked to government policy+ An unemployed person is unlikely to blame the gov-
ernment for his or her personal situation, but people who are aware of rising job-
lessness in their country or community are likely to hold the government
accountable for this development, regardless of their employment status+ In the
case of trade preferences, if available information convinces a person that many
in the United States are being adversely affected by free trade, even if he is not, it
25+ For a full review, see ibid+
26+ Green and Gerken, for example, found that smoking-related policy preferences were signifi-
cantly influenced by whether a person was a smoker+ The few exceptions are simple policies with
straightforward effects on individuals, such as the effects of nonsmoking policies on smokers+As com-
plex, difficult to understand agreements, trade policies would not naturally fall into this category of
policies in which one would expect self-interest to affect political preferences+ See Green and Gerken
1989+
27+ See Sears and Funk 1990; and Mutz 1992+
28+ Kinder and Kiewiet 1981+
29+ See, for example, Brody and Sniderman 1977; and Mutz 1994+
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will be the former, sociotropic perception that shapes his trade policy preferences
rather than how trade has influenced his personal economic well-being+
To summarize, research on the role of economic well-being on political prefer-
ences would warn against the assumption of self-interest as the driving force behind
attitudes toward trade+ Studies of mass opinion have repeatedly shown that indi-
viduals rarely form political preferences on the basis of economic self-interest+
Although early studies of U+S+ voting behavior attributed the surge enjoyed by
incumbent parties in good economic times, and the anti-incumbent preferences in
bad economic times, to so-called “pocketbook” voting, once these studies moved
beyond aggregates to the individual level of analysis, it became clear that self-
interest was not the mechanism driving economic accountability+ The people helped
or hurt by the economy were not those rewarding and punishing accordingly;
instead, accountability rested on citizens’ perceptions of how the nation as a whole
was faring—perceptions that might or might not be accurate+
In some ways, this account is quite consistent with the relatively poor perfor-
mance of the leading political economy models in explaining individuals’ trade
policy attitudes+ Effects have appeared weak to nonexistent in many studies or
have been derived from measures such as education, the interpretation of which
remains ambiguous+ Moreover, because many studies have used aggregate-level
measures of preferences and impact, and none have asked about sociotropic per-
ceptions, previous research has not been able to distinguish these various sources
of trade preferences+
In this study, we use individual-level data that include multiple measures of
attitudes toward trade+ To date, few analyses of trade preferences have utilized
data gathered at the individual level+30 In all but a handful of studies, trade atti-
tudes have been inferred from aggregate vote results, patterns of campaign contri-
butions, or the outcomes of the policy debates themselves+ Importantly, aggregate-
level data can produce evidence of self-interested attitudes toward trade policies
that is impossible to distinguish from preferences formed on a sociotropic basis,
that is, on the basis of how people think the collective as a whole is influenced+
In addition, previous individual-level studies have generally relied on single-
item indicators+ Individual questions tend to be unreliable and sensitive to ques-
tion wording and to the framing of options, problems that are easily avoided if
responses across a variety of measures produce a reliable index+31 We also use
these data to expand the potential ways in which self-interest might enter into
these policy preferences, beyond skill levels and industry impact+
Interestingly, most research on this topic has not viewed trade as a political
issue+ Instead, the emphasis in explaining trade attitudes has been on how trade
30+ These studies include Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Balistreri 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001;
Baker 2003 and 2005; Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004; Mayda and
Rodrik 2005; Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Hiscox 2006; and
Kocher and Minushkin 2006+
31+ See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, 84–85; Worldviews 2002; and Hiscox 2006+
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positively or negatively affects individuals economically+With these data, we exam-
ine not only the dominant political economy models, but also the sociotropic hypoth-
esis, which is the preference formation model most widely documented in public
opinion research on economic policy preferences+ In so doing, we not only improve
our overall understanding of the origins of attitudes toward trade, we also reveal
the importance of the kind of political information that reaches citizens in explain-
ing American preferences in this policy domain+
Study Design
Using two representative national surveys, we attempt to move beyond ecological
inferences and the limitations of previous individual-level surveys by asking work-
ing and temporarily unemployed Americans about their attitudes toward trade and
related matters+ One was a telephone survey conducted as part of the National
Annenberg Election Study ~NAES! during the summer of 2004+32 The other was a
survey conducted via Internet or Web TV by Knowledge Networks ~KN! in sum-
mer 2007+
We focus on the attitudes of Americans for various reasons+ First, the United
States has been the dominant country in the global trading system for more than
half a century+ As a result, social scientists have expressed substantial interest in
the factors driving U+S+ trade policy+ The attitudes of Americans toward trade are
likely to influence outcomes in this policy arena+33 Second, a number of key stud-
ies of trade attitudes center on the United States+34 Focusing on the attitudes of
Americans should enhance the comparability of our results to these previous
analyses+
The Dependent Variables
Two survey questions served to construct the dependent variables in the analyses
based on the NAES survey:
1+ As you may know, international trade has increased substantially in recent
years. This increase is due to the lowering of trade barriers between coun-
tries, that is, tariffs or taxes that make it more difficult or more expensive to
buy and sell things across international borders. Do you think government
should try to encourage international trade or to discourage international
32+ The conservative AAPOR Response Rate I calculation was 23 percent, which represents a min-
imum possible response rate+
33+ Fordham and McKeown 2003+
34+ See, for example, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Burgoon and His-
cox 2004; and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, 474–81, 487–91+
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trade? Do you think the government should [encourage/discourage] this a
lot or only a little?
2+ I’m going to read you some actions the federal government in Washington
can take on a variety of issues. For each one please tell me whether you
favor or oppose the federal government doing it. . . . How about the federal
government negotiating more free trade agreements like NAFTA? Do you favor
or oppose the federal government doing this? Is that strongly [favor/oppose]
or only somewhat [favor/oppose]?
Each item was scored on a five-point scale, or a four-point scale in the KN sur-
vey+35 The highest ~lowest! score was assigned to respondents who believed that the
government should encourage ~discourage! international trade a lot and who strongly
favored ~opposed! the government negotiating free trade agreements, respectively+36
Our first dependent variable is the mean score for these two items+ The second
dependent variable is an ordered trichotomous measure that equals 1 if a respon-
dent opposes free trade agreements and believes that international trade should be
discouraged, and 3 if he or she favors free trade agreements and believes that
international trade should be encouraged+ All other respondents were scored as 2+
This variable therefore groups individuals based on whether they have a consis-
tent preference for open trade or protectionism, or whether their preferences are
inconsistent+37
Five survey questions were used to generate the dependent variable for the analy-
sis based on the KN survey+ The first two questions were identical to those described
earlier, but three additional items were asked as well:
3+ Do you believe that globalization, especially the increasing connections of
our economy with others around the world, is good or bad for the United
States?
4+ Should foreign companies be encouraged or discouraged from investing in
the United States, for example, by building their factories in this country?
5+ Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable,
or very unfavorable opinion of the WTO, the World Trade Organization?
Each of these items was scored on a four-point scale+ The highest ~lowest! score
was assigned to respondents who believed that the government should strongly
35+ These two items are especially useful because one segment of the literature on trade policy
preferences focuses on free trade agreements and another segment addresses more general attitudes
toward trade+ On this first segment, see, for example, Balistreri 1997; and Baker 2003+
36+ For the first item, individuals who expressed no opinion or refused to answer were assigned to a
middle category; for the second item, such individuals were grouped with respondents who neither
favored nor opposed free trade agreements+
37+ Combining these two items has various advantages, chiefly that the dependent variable is a
more reliable measure and less prone to problems associated with idiosyncratic wording or measure-
ment error than if we analyzed each item separately+ On this issue, see Baker 2003, 444, fn+ 35+
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encourage ~discourage! international trade, who strongly favored ~opposed! the
government negotiating free trade agreements, who felt that globalization is very
good ~bad! for the United States, who strongly encouraged ~discouraged! foreign
investment in the United States, and who had a very favorable ~unfavorable! opin-
ion of the WTO+ The mean of the responses to these five items is our third depen-
dent variable+
Although these items clearly do not address exactly the same issues, it is note-
worthy just how consistent people’s preferences were across the questions+ Experts
on these issues might anticipate that people would have different attitudes on the
North American Free Trade Agreement ~NAFTA! than on free trade more gener-
ally, or toward direct foreign investment than toward the World Trade Organiza-
tion ~WTO!+ Nonetheless, responses to these five questions indicated a very high
degree of internal consistency, with a Cronbach’s alpha of greater than 0+80 and a
Cramer’s V that averages about 0+80 for pairs of the items+ In short, people’s atti-
tudes are very consistent across these facets of international economic relations,
so much so that it would be inaccurate to describe them as anything other than a
single underlying protrade or antitrade preference+
The Independent Variables
Our key independent variables fall into three broad categories: ~1! indicators of
the individual characteristics suggested by the factor endowments and specific fac-
tors models, ~2! indicators of respondents’ perceptions of how trade influences
their family’s financial conditions as well as the country as a whole, and ~3! indi-
cators tapping potential noneconomic influences on trade preferences, including
nationalism, ethnocentrism, and attitudes toward intervention in the affairs of other
countries+
To analyze self-interest within the first category of models, we include mea-
sures of a respondent’s skill level and features of his or her industry of employ-
ment+ Economic studies typically use the average annual wage for an individual’s
occupation and the extent of an individual’s formal education to measure skill, a
tack that has been followed in much of the research on trade attitudes+38 In both
surveys, we therefore asked individuals, “In your current ~or most recent! job,
what kind of work do you do?” Each respondent’s occupation was then coded
using the U+S+ Department of Labor’s Standard Occupational Classification ~SOC!
system+ We used data compiled by the Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor
Statistics to calculate average annual wage in 2003 ~for the 2004 survey! and
in 2006 ~for the 2007 survey! for each occupation in our sample+39 We also asked
38+ See Attewell 1990, 425; Spenner 1990, 407; Balistreri 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Hays,
Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+
39+ The data on occupation and wages are taken from U+S+ Department of Labor 2008a and 2008b,
respectively+
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each respondent about his or her formal education and created three dummy vari-
ables based on this information+ The first, some college, indicates whether the
person graduated from a technical school or a two-year college, or whether the
respondent attended but did not graduate from a four-college+ The second, col-
lege graduate, indicates whether he or she graduated from a four-year college;
and the third, graduate school, indicates whether the person attended graduate
school+ The reference category is someone who did not receive any formal educa-
tion beyond high school+
To test the specific factors model using the NAES survey, we asked open-ended
questions of each respondent about the industry in which they work, as well as
details about their occupations+ Because the full range of occupations and indus-
tries cannot easily be coded in real time, respondents were probed at length for
details+ Based on audio recordings of their responses, they were later assigned to
one of the U+S+ Census Bureau’s three-digit North American Industry Codes
~NAIC!+40 In the KN survey, we presented respondents with a list of the three-
digit NAIC categories and asked them to select the one that best described the
industry in which they work or most recently worked+ For each industry repre-
sented in our sample, i , we constructed one measure of export orientation and
another measure of import competition+ export orientation is defined as the
natural logarithm of ~Xi 0Yi ! and import competition is defined as the natural
logarithm of ~Mi 0Yi !, where Xi is sector i ’s total exports, Mi is the volume of
imports in sector i , and Yi is this sector’s total output+ These variables are derived
using 2003 data for the NAES survey and 2006 data for the KN survey+41 Various
industries in our sample are nontradable and therefore do not export or import
goods+ Since the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, we arbitrarily add 0+01 to
both Xi and Mi + The specific factors model predicts that individuals employed in
industries that export a substantial portion of output should support open trade,
whereas those working in sectors that face extensive competition from imports
should be especially hostile to overseas commerce+
To distinguish evidence of self-interested policy preferences from sociotropic
ones, an item in both surveys asked how respondents thought the nation as a whole
had been influenced by trade+ Respondents answered using a five-point scale rang-
ing from “helped a lot” ~5! to “hurt a lot” ~1!+42 A parallel item asked about the
40+ For a list of the three-digit industry classifications, see U+S+ Census Bureau 2008a+ Note that
our sample is representative of the distribution of workers across industries in the U+S+ population as a
whole+We compared the distribution of respondents across industries in our sample to the distribution
in the U+S+ population, using data provided by U+S+ Census Bureau 2008b+ For each industry, the per-
centage of respondents in our sample is much the same as the percentage of the U+S+ workforce+
41+ Data on exports and imports are taken from U+S+ International Trade Commission 2008+ We
used version 2+7+4 of the data when analyzing the NAES survey and version 2+8+4 of the data when
analyzing the KN survey+ Data on output are taken from U+S+ Department of Commerce 2008 ~Bureau
of Economic Analysis!+
42+ People who refused to answer this question or who said they did not know the answer were
grouped together with people who answered that trade neither hurts nor helps the economy+
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perceived effect of trade on the financial situation of the person’s family+Although
the latter variable might appear to be an indicator of subjectively assessed self-
interest, it is included to take into account however much slippage may occur
between actual self-interest and what people perceive to be in their economic inter-
ests+ These perceptions are inevitably a function of personal experience, but they
also reflect information that causes people to attribute a particular economic situ-
ation to international trade+
As shown in Figure 1, both surveys demonstrate a slight skew toward percep-
tions that trade has adversely affected the economy+ The NAES survey produced a
roughly uniform distribution across the five response categories from “helped a
lot” to “hurt a lot,” whereas the KN results are more bimodal, with most respon-
dents feeling that trade has either helped or hurt the economy “a little+”
Importantly, both distributions deviate starkly from the distribution on this same
scale for the American public’s perceived effects of trade on their family’s finan-
cial well being+ Based on both surveys, there is a striking tendency for respondents
to claim that trade has not affected their family’s financial situation+ Indeed, “no
effect” is the modal response when people are asked to assess trade’s perceived
effects on their personal economic situation, which is consistent with the fact that
most Americans are employed in nontradable sectors of the economy+
In the KN survey, we also included three indexes designed to help clarify the
role of education in shaping trade preferences+ Toward this end, we added items
addressing three well-studied orientations that are known to be a function of edu-
cation and that also are potentially linked to attitudes toward foreign commerce+
First, regardless of context, well-educated people tend to favor a more activist
role for the United States in foreign policy matters+ Such individuals, for example,
hold more favorable views of the United Nations, are more willing to normalize
relations with Cuba, are more likely to favor signing international treaties, and
generally endorse a more active role for the United States in foreign affairs than
less-educated individuals+43 Thus, protrade preferences among the well-educated
may be a function of the same underlying tendency to involve one’s self in affairs
beyond national borders+ Second, the poorly educated tend to have a stronger sense
of nationalism, which might also account for their hostility to open overseas com-
merce+ Finally, ethnocentrism—that is, the tendency to think less of those who are
racially or ethnically different from one’s own group—is tied to education and
may also promote antitrade preferences+ To the extent that the observed effects of
education stem from any of these factors, it puts a different cast on what drives
attitudes toward trade+
Our first index, isolationism, is comprised of five widely used items tapping the
extent to which respondents believe the United States should adopt an isolationist
or an activist stance on international affairs+ Notably, these items do not address
economic relations between countries so much as whether the United States should
43+ See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, chap+ 6; Erikson and Tedin 2005; and Fordham 2008+
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intervene to prevent human rights abuses abroad, cooperate with foreign countries
to solve global problems, and so forth+44 The second index, nationalism, draws
44+ See Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983, Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981; and Herrmann, Tetlock, and
Diascro 2001+ These five items are as follows+ “Please tell us whether you agree or disagree with each
of the following statements: @RANDOMIZED ORDER# ~1! The U+S+ needs to play an active role in
FIGURE 1. The perceived impact of trade on respondents’ families and on the
U.S. economy
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on three previously used questions to assess whether respondents believe that the
United States is culturally superior to other countries+45 The third index, ethno-
centrism, taps “prejudice, broadly conceived+”46 Ethnocentrism scales are designed
to measure the “commonplace inclination to divide the world into in-groups and
out-groups, the former characterized by virtuosity and talent, the latter by corrup-
tion and mediocrity+”47 By asking an individual about some positive and some
negative human characteristics with reference to the in-group as well as what are
out-groups for that given person, we obtain an indicator of the extent to which the
person employs an in-group0out-group mode of thinking+48 To construct these mea-
sures, we use the same racial and ethnic in-groups and out-groups as previous stud-
ies ~blacks, whites, and Hispanics!+ Each of these three indexes was highly reliable,
with Cronbach’s alphas greater than 0+80+ All were standardized, with a mean of
zero, and coded such that larger positive ~negative! values of these variables reflect
views that are more ~less! isolationist, nationalistic, and ethnocentric, respectively+
In addition, our models include measures of party identification ~one variable
indicating whether respondents describe themselves as a Democrat and another
indicating whether they describe themselves as Republican, with the reference cat-
egory being someone without a partisan affiliation!, whether anyone in the home
belonged to a union, whether the respondent was currently unemployed or laid
off, age, gender ~which equals 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if she is female!,
and family income+
In the following tests, we use ordinary least squares ~OLS! to analyze our nine-
point measure of trade policy preferences based on the NAES survey and our mea-
sure based on the KN survey, since both of them have a roughly normal distribution+
To analyze the ordered trichotomous measure of the consistency of trade policy
preferences across the two items, we use an ordered logit specification+ All tests
solving conflicts around the world; ~2! The U+S+ government should just try to take care of the well-
being of Americans and not get involved with other nations; ~3! It is essential for the United States to
work with other nations to solve problems, such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution; ~4! It will
be best for the future of the country if we stay out of world affairs; ~5! The United States has the
responsibility to play the role of ‘world policeman,’ that is, to fight violations of international law and
aggression wherever they occur+”
45+ Rankin 2001+ These three items are as follows+ “To what extent do you agree or disagree with
each of these statements? @RANDOMIZED ORDER#: ~1! In the United States, our people are not
perfect, but our culture is superior to others; ~2! I would rather be a citizen of America than of any
other country in the world; ~3! The world would be a better place if people from other countries were
more like Americans+”
46+ Levinson 1949, 19+
47+ Kam and Kinder 2007, 321+ All respondents are asked about their racial ethnic group as well as
two out-groups+ Ethnocentrism is the difference between the mean for positive-negative characteristics
attributed to the in-group and the same characteristics attributed to the out-group+ “Next are some ques-
tions about various groups in our society+ Below are seven-point scales on which you can rate charac-
teristics of people in different groups+Where would you rate physicians in general on this scale? Where
would you rate @BLACKS0WHITES0HISPANIC-AMERICANS# in general on these scales?” The scales
range from 1 to 7, anchored by Hard Working-Lazy, Efficient-Wasteful, and Trustworthy-Untrustworthy+
48+ Levinson 1949+
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of statistical significance are based on robust standard errors, which account for
any heteroskedasticity in the data and which are clustered by the state in which
the respondent resides+
Results
Table 1 shows the results based on the NAES nine-point index of trade opinions,
Table 2 reports the results based on the NAES trichotomous index, and Table 3
presents the results based on the mean of the five items on trade opinions from the
KN survey+ In each table, we start by estimating a model to test the factor endow-
ments and specific factors hypotheses+ This model includes occupational wages,
education, the industry of employment’s exposure to trade, and the control vari-
ables+ Then we supplement this baseline model with additional variables to eval-
uate the impact of perceptions of trade’s influence on the national economy and to
assess the robustness of our results+
Our initial findings offer some apparent support for the factor endowments
hypothesis+ For each dependent variable, the coefficient estimates of some col-
lege, college graduate, and graduate school are positive and jointly statis-
tically significant+ Furthermore, the results in each table indicate that respondents
become increasingly supportive of open trade as they obtain more formal educa-
tion+ The estimated coefficient of some college is always the smallest among
these three variables and the coefficient estimate of graduate school is always
the largest+ Individuals who attended graduate school are much more supportive
of open trade than both people with only a high school education and those with
some college education+ Each coefficient estimate of graduate school is statis-
tically significant+ Additional analyses of the incremental effect of each additional
level of education furnish mixed results+49 In the KN survey, each additional level
of achievement—from high school to some college, and from some college to a
four-year college degree—contributes to greater support for trade+ Graduate school,
on the other hand, does not contribute additional support beyond what one receives
by virtue of having completed a four-year college degree+ In the NAES study, by
contrast, a graduate school education has a statistically significant impact on trade
support beyond receiving a four-year degree, whereas prior levels of educational
achievement ~some college and a college degree! do not contribute significantly+
Whereas education exerts a strong influence on attitudes about trade, the effect
of occupational wages is weak+ The coefficient estimate of average annual wage
is positive, which is consistent with the factor endowments approach, but it is
49+ The additional analyses to test the incremental effect of each level of educational achievement
were conducted by coding education as a set of nested dummy variables+ All people with graduate
degrees were coded as also having four-year degrees and some college, all who had four-year degrees
were coded as also having completed some college, and so forth+
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small and far from statistically significant+ Furthermore, the results offer no sup-
port for the specific factors hypothesis since neither export orientation nor
import competition has a statistically significant impact on trade preferences+
There is little evidence that individuals form attitudes about trade based on how
trade affects their income+ But as shown in the second columns of Tables 1, 2, and
3, there is strong evidence that these attitudes are formed in response to percep-
tions of how trade affects the U+S+ economy+ Respondents who feel that trade ben-
efits the economy as a whole are significantly more likely to favor open trade than
TABLE 1. The determinants of trade preferences, based on the NAES
nine-point index
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
some college 0+068 0+024 0+041 0+025 0+070
~0+089! ~0+082! ~0+074! ~0+082! ~0+070!
college graduate 0+164 0+111 0+131 0+110 0+060
~0+122! ~0+087! ~0+071! ~0+087! ~0+069!
graduate school 0+377*** 0+304** 0+319*** 0+305** 0+248**
~0+100! ~0+089! ~0+082! ~0+089! ~0+078!
average annual wage 0+000 0+000 0+000
~0+000! ~0+000! ~0+000!
export orientation 0+174 0+033 0+089 0+076
~0+170! ~0+133! ~0+114! ~0+114!
import competition 0+129 0+011 0+097 0+090
~0+163! ~0+126! ~0+108! ~0+109!
tariff rate 0+025
~0+021!
perceived effect of 0.361*** 0.380*** 0.363*** 0.297***
trade on u.s. ~0+024! ~0+020! ~0+024! ~0+020!
perceived effect of 0+247***
trade on self ~0+033!
union membership 0+443*** 0+331*** 0+338*** 0+331*** 0+325***
~0+079! ~0+070! ~0+055! ~0+070! ~0+053!
unemployed 0+168 0+034 0+030 0+033 0+085
~0+186! ~0+183! ~0+174! ~0+183! ~0+158!
republican 0+014 0+047 0+018 0+047 0+074
~0+065! ~0+069! ~0+068! ~0+068! ~0+066!
democrat 0+173 0+082 0+078 0+080 0+090
~0+097! ~0+088! ~0+069! ~0+088! ~0+070!
male 0+211* 0+128 0+076 0+123 0+064
~0+101! ~0+084! ~0+068! ~0+083! ~0+066!
age 0+003 0+002 0+002 0+002 0+003
~0+003! ~0+003! ~0+002! ~0+003! ~0+002!
income 0+017 0+000 0+014 0+000 0+014
~0+026! ~0+024! ~0+019! ~0+024! ~0+017!
Constant 2+992*** 2+201*** 2+334*** 2+184*** 1+927***
~0+212! ~0+204! ~0+166! ~0+220! ~0+155!
R-square 0+077 0+253 0+263 0+252 0+293
Adjusted R-square 0+062 0+240 0+254 0+240 0+284
N 851 851 1084 851 1084
Notes: Entries are ordinary least squares regression estimates with robust standard errors, clustered by the respondent’s
state of residence, in parentheses+ Two-tailed tests of statistical significance are conducted for all coefficient esti-
mates+ Statistical significance is indicated as follows:  p , +10; * p , +05; ** p , +01; *** p , +001+
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those who believe that trade is economically harmful, providing considerable sup-
port for sociotropic arguments about overseas commerce+ Including perceived
effect of trade on u.s. substantially strengthens the model’s explanatory power,
increasing the adjusted coefficient of variation ~R2! by about fourfold in Table 1
and by roughly sevenfold in Table 3+ In addition, doing so weakens the effects of
gender, partisanship, and age+
TABLE 2. The determinants of trade preferences, based on the NAES
trichotomous index
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
some college 0+111 0+004 0+003 0+006 0+049
~0+154! ~0+163! ~0+152! ~0+163! ~0+150!
college graduate 0+256 0+216 0+247 0+215 0+130
~0+220! ~0+179! ~0+151! ~0+180! ~0+151!
graduate school 0+598** 0+596** 0+507** 0+597** 0+388*
~0+187! ~0+190! ~0+166! ~0+191! ~0+163!
average annual wage 0+000 0+000 0+000
~0+000! ~0+000! ~0+000!
export orientation 0+280 0+056 0+172 0+156
~0+299! ~0+261! ~0+223! ~0+234!
import competition 0+209 0+020 0+181 0+175
~0+282! ~0+244! ~0+209! ~0+221!
tariff rate 0+038
~0+044!
perceived effect of 0+639*** 0+669*** 0+641*** 0+536***
trade on u.s. ~0+051! ~0+042! ~0+050! ~0+043!
perceived effect of 0+429***
trade on self ~0+071!
union membership 0+626*** 0+493*** 0+487*** 0+493*** 0+474***
~0+120! ~0+132! ~0+098! ~0+132! ~0+097!
unemployed 0+287 0+020 0+040 0+018 0+132
~0+340! ~0+402! ~0+379! ~0+402! ~0+369!
republican 0+036 0+086 0+047 0+086 0+141
~0+139! ~0+151! ~0+137! ~0+150! ~0+136!
democrat 0+276 0+159 0+192 0+155 0+219
~0+185! ~0+195! ~0+161! ~0+194! ~0+161!
male 0+393* 0+290 0+185 0+280 0+167
~0+164! ~0+154! ~0+135! ~0+155! ~0+136!
age 0+004 0+002 0+005 0+002 0+006
~0+005! ~0+005! ~0+004! ~0+005! ~0+004!
income 0+024 0+009 0+031 0+010 0+030
~0+040! ~0+042! ~0+031! ~0+042! ~0+029!
Cut_1 1+247*** 0+003 0+348 0+020 0+353
~0+359! ~0+400! ~0+290! ~0+429! ~0+299!
Cut_2 1+125** 2+710*** 2+362*** 2+725*** 3+124***
~0+378! ~0+409! ~0+295! ~0+439! ~0+313!
Pseudo log likelihood 829+509 759+039 969+012 759+390 953+927
Pseudo R-square 0+030 0+113 0+114 0+112 0+128
N 851 851 1084 851 1084
Notes: Entries are ordered logit estimates with robust standard errors, clustered by the respondent’s state of resi-
dence, in parentheses+ Two-tailed tests of statistical significance are conducted for all coefficient estimates+ Statistical
significance is indicated as follows:  p , +10; * p , +05; ** p , +01; *** p , +001+
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Our initial results—in the first column of Tables 1, 2, and 3—provide clear evi-
dence of a gender gap, with women holding more protectionist attitudes than men+50
There is also evidence of a partisan split, although the nature of this split differs
across the two surveys+ Based on the findings in Table 1, Democrats are more
protectionist than either unaffiliated individuals or Republicans+ Based on the find-
ings in Table 3, there is no difference between the estimated coefficients of dem-
ocrat and republican, but Republicans are more protectionist than unaffiliated
voters+ Equally, the results in Table 3 indicate that people become more protec-
tionist as they grow older+All of these relationships except the split between Repub-
licans and unaffiliated voters in Table 3, however, become attenuated once we add
the sociotropic variable to the model+ Including this variable also reduces the mag-
nitude of education’s impact on preferences about overseas commerce, especially
when analyzing the KN index+
Consistent with existing research, Tables 1 and 2 further indicate that union
membership affects an individual’s attitude toward trade+51 Respondents who either
were a union member or had a union member in their family were much less
likely to be protrade than those without a union affiliation+ However, income seems
to have no bearing on trade preferences+ In addition, what little evidence there is
that unemployment influences these preferences ~see the second and third col-
umns of Table 3! becomes much weaker once we account for respondents’ per-
ceptions of how trade has influenced their family financial situation ~see the fourth
column of Table 3!+
Taken together, our results indicate that perceptions of how trade affects the
U+S+ economy, union membership, and education strongly influence mass opinion
about trade+ To further analyze the impact of these factors, we estimate the effects
of a change in each factor on the predicted probability that our trichotomous depen-
dent variable equals 1 ~consistent opposition to trade! and 3 ~consistent support
for trade!, respectively+ These predicted probabilities are generated using Stata’s
prvalue program, based on the model in the second column of Table 2, and setting
the remaining continuous variables to their sample means and the remaining dis-
crete variables to their modal categories+52
The results indicate that the perception of trade’s effects on the U+S+ economy
has a sizable impact on trade preferences+ A change from not being sure whether
trade benefits the U+S+ economy ~a score of 3! to the view that trade has helped
the economy “a little” ~a score of 4! yields about a 50 percent increase in the
probability that a respondent consistently supports free trade; a change to the belief
that trade helps the economy “a lot” ~a score of 5! yields roughly a 100 percent
increase in this probability+
50+ See O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Baker 2005; Hays, Ehrlich, and
Peinhardt 2005; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+
51+ See Balistreri 1997; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+
52+ On this program, see Long and Freese 2005+ Note that these results are virtually identical if we
rely on the estimates in the third or fourth columns of Table 2+
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TABLE 3. The determinants of trade preferences, based on the KN index
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
some college 0+146* 0+072 0+073 0+069 0+050 0+027
~0+061! ~0+051! ~0+050! ~0+050! ~0+048! ~0+048!
college graduate 0+284*** 0+155*** 0+158*** 0+143** 0+107* 0+056
~0+061! ~0+044! ~0+043! ~0+043! ~0+043! ~0+043!
graduate school 0+338*** 0+177** 0+181*** 0+153** 0+121* 0+031
~0+063! ~0+051! ~0+051! ~0+054! ~0+057! ~0+050!
average annual 0+000 0+000 0+000 0+000 0+000 0+000
wage ~0+000! ~0+000! ~0+000! ~0+000! ~0+000! ~0+000!
export orientation 0+030 0+017 0+043 0+038 0+029
~0+051! ~0+026! ~0+027! ~0+029! ~0+026!
import competition 0+032 0+017 0+040 0+035 0+030
~0+045! ~0+024! ~0+025! ~0+027! ~0+025!
tariff rate 0+007
~0+009!
perceived effect 0+300*** 0+300*** 0+257*** 0+254*** 0+249***
of trade on u.s. ~0+010! ~0+010! ~0+011! ~0+011! ~0+012!
perceived effect 0.101*** 0.100*** 0.075***
of trade on self ~0+015! ~0+016! ~0+018!
union membership 0+001 0+045 0+046 0+052 0+054 0+066
~0+053! ~0+043! ~0+043! ~0+043! ~0+043! ~0+048!
unemployed 0+126 0+128* 0+130* 0+089 0+089 0+075
~0+090! ~0+062! ~0+063! ~0+063! ~0+063! ~0+070!
republican 0+118* 0+095* 0+096* 0+113** 0+110* 0+123*
~0+052! ~0+041! ~0+041! ~0+042! ~0+042! ~0+047!
democrat 0+081 0+032 0+034 0+034 0+032 0+044
~0+061! ~0+039! ~0+039! ~0+038! ~0+039! ~0+048!
male 0+100** 0+035 0+033 0+034 0+024 0+009
~0+032! ~0+030! ~0+030! ~0+030! ~0+029! ~0+031!
age 0+004* 0+002 0+002 0+002 0+001 0+002
~0+002! ~0+001! ~0+001! ~0+001! ~0+001! ~0+001!
income 0+010 0+010 0+010 0+006 0+003 0+005
~0+012! ~0+010! ~0+010! ~0+010! ~0+009! ~0+009!
economics class 0+044 0+056
~0+026! ~0+030!
economists’ view 0.062* 0.055+
of trade ~0+026! ~0+027!
isolationism 0+099***
~0+011!
ethnocentrism 0+029**
~0+010!
nationalism 0+023
~0+019!
Constant 2+723*** 1+902*** 1+936*** 1+754*** 1+759*** 1+886***
~0+087! ~0+084! ~0+090! ~0+076! ~0+077! ~0+087!
R-square 0+070 0+446 0+446 0+463 0+466 0+480
Adjusted R-square 0+064 0+442 0+442 0+458 0+461 0+474
N 1995 1995 1995 1995 1992 1822
Notes: Entries are ordinary least squares regression estimates with robust standard errors, clustered by the respondent’s
state of residence, in parentheses+ Two-tailed tests of statistical significance are conducted for all coefficient esti-
mates+ Statistical significance is indicated as follows:  p , +10; * p , +05; ** p , +01; *** p , +001+
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Union membership also has a considerable influence on the probability of
supporting trade+ People with a union member in their household are about 35
percent more likely to oppose trade than other individuals+ At first blush, it is
tempting to interpret the effect of union membership as an indicator of self-
interested preferences+ This might be the case if union members work in indus-
tries that are adversely affected by trade or are relatively low-skilled workers+
However, we have already accounted for the industry of employment and skill
level, suggesting that union membership is not simply a feature of self-interest+
Instead, unions probably influence attitudes on trade by disseminating informa-
tion: most major unions oppose trade liberalization and free trade arrangements,
and promote such views among their rank and file+ Interestingly, most union
members in our surveys work in nontradable sectors, such as primary, second-
ary, and higher education+ There is no reason why trade would harm these
individuals+
Education also has a marked effect on trade preferences+ People with a graduate
school education, for example, are about 65 percent more likely to consistently sup-
port trade than people with either a high school education or some college educa-
tion but not a four-year degree+ All of these effects are statistically significant+53
It is worth considering whether sociotropic perceptions of how trade affects the
nation as a whole are potentially rationalized from pre-existing policy opinions+ In
other words, might people have a priori opinions on trade from some other influ-
ence and then rationalize from those issue preferences to an evaluation of how
trade affects the nation’s economy?
In using sociotropic perceptions of trade’s impact as a predictor of trade prefer-
ences, we did not assume that such perceptions were completely exogenous+ Indeed,
previous work suggests that sociotropic perceptions of closely related issues such
as unemployment and national economic decline are spawned by media coverage
as well as by local economic conditions+54 Moreover, there is some evidence to
suggest that the same pattern of origins is true of trade perceptions+55 Whereas
media coverage may alter sociotropic perceptions, it generally has no direct effect
on opinions, thus implying that the ordering we have suggested must be largely
correct+ Information sources alter collective-level perceptions, and these in turn
alter policy preferences+56
Importantly, it is obvious from our results that inclusion of the sociotropic vari-
able has no bearing on whether the variables representing self-interest demon-
53+ Recall that, based on the results in Table 3, there is also evidence of a split between Republi-
cans and unaffiliated individuals+ However, the magnitude of this split is quite modest+ A change in
party affiliation from unaffiliated to Republican yields less than a 4 percent reduction in the predicted
value of the KN index, holding constant the continuous variables in our model at their sample means
and the remaining discrete variables at their modal categories+
54+ See, for example, Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller 1980; Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1986;
and Mutz 1998+
55+ See Busch and Reinhardt 2000; and Mansfield and Mutz 2006+
56+ Mutz 1992+
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strate influence+ Regardless of ordering, we find little evidence that self-interest
forms the basis of trade preferences+ But if sociotropic perceptions were merely
rationalizations of pre-existing issue attachments, one would expect panel data to
show null effects from changing sociotropic perceptions over time+ However, as
in our results, panel analyses show that sociotropic perceptions have a strong and
significant influence on political preferences+57
The Robustness of the Results
Having generated some initial estimates of our models, we now assess the robust-
ness of our results+ First, in coding the data on occupation based on the NAES
survey, it was not possible to assign every respondent an SOC code+ Conse-
quently, the size of our sample in Tables 1 and 2 is reduced when including aver-
age annual wage in the model+ Since this variable has little impact on trade
preferences and to ensure that the effects of the remaining variables remain stable
when we analyze the largest possible sample, we estimate the models using the
NAES data after dropping average annual wage+ As shown in the third col-
umn of Tables 1 and 2, this change in the model’s specification has no bearing on
any variable except college graduate, which now has a marginally significant
effect in Table 1, and male, which no longer has a statistically significant effect in
Table 2+
Second, our initial findings do not support the specific factors hypothesis+ One
reason might be the measures we used to test this hypothesis+ In addition to mea-
suring the export orientation and import competition of a respondent’s industry
of employment, a few studies have analyzed whether the tariff rate of this indus-
try affects his or her trade preferences+58 Hence, we replace the variables tapping
export orientation and import competition with a measure of his or her industry’s
2003 ~for the NAES survey! or 2006 ~for the KN survey! tariff rate+59 Like Scheve
and Slaughter, we estimate the effective tariff rate by taking the natural loga-
rithm of the ratio of customs revenue to total imports in each sector, using data
compiled by the U+S+ International Trade Commission+60 Nontradable sectors are
assigned a tariff rate of zero+ Since the natural logarithm of zero is undefined, we
arbitrarily add 0+01 to each ~unlogged! tariff rate, thereby retaining all of our
original observations+
57+ See, for example, Kiewiet 1983+
58+ See, for example, Scheve and Slaughter 2001+
59+ We do not include export orientation, import competition, and the tariff rate in the same model
because the first two variables are fairly highly correlated with the latter variable+
60+ Scheve and Slaughter 2001+ The data are available at U+S+ International Trade Commission 2008+
We used version 2+7+4 of the data when analyzing the NAES survey and version 2+8+4 of the data when
analyzing the KN survey+
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Scheve and Slaughter argue that industries marked by extensive protection are
likely to be at a comparative disadvantage+61 As such, the specific-factors model
predicts individuals in such industries should be hostile to open trade and should
press for protectionism+ Our tests, however, continue to provide no support for
this approach+ As shown in the fourth columns of Tables 1 and 2 and the third
column of Table 3, the coefficient estimate of tariff rate is always small and far
from statistically significant+
Third, to bolster assessment of self-interest beyond the factor endowments and
specific factors measures, respondents in the NAES survey also were asked direct
questions about the extent to which their place of work is involved in importing
and exporting+ They were asked whether their workplace: ~1! exports products,
~2! imports products, ~3! supplies products or services to companies that import
or export, or ~4! outsources some of its work to other countries+ None of these
measures of how trade affects their place of employment had a significant bearing
on trade preferences+ Nor did including these variables have any impact on the
remaining results+
To further address whether the effects of trade on an individual’s personal life
influences or his or her trade preferences, we included in the model respondents’
perceptions of how they and their family had been influenced by open trade, as illus-
trated in Figure 1+ Including this variable in our models of trade preferences is par-
ticularly important because we want to ensure that the observed effect of people’s
attitudes about how trade affects the nation is not simply an outgrowth of their atti-
tudes about how trade has influenced them on a personal level+ The results in the
final column of Tables 1 and 2 and the fourth column of Table 3 show that people
who feel that trade has helped them and their family support trade+62 In all three
tables, the coefficient estimate of perceived effect of trade on self is posi-
tive and statistically significant+ These estimates are also fairly large+ For example,
a change from not being sure whether trade benefits a respondent ~a score of 3! to
holding the opinion that trade helps him or her “a little” ~a score of 4! yields about
a 40 percent increase in the probability that a respondent consistently supports free
trade; a change to the belief that trade helps the person “a lot” ~a score of 5! yields
roughly a 90 percent increase in this probability+ Nonetheless, the effect of this vari-
able is somewhat less than that of the sociotropic variable, whose coefficient is only
marginally smaller than in our earlier analysis, and this difference is statistically
significant based on the results in Table 3+ Even after accounting for subjective per-
ceptions of how trade affects a respondent, perceptions of how trade influences the
nation have a strong and sizable impact on whether people support open trade+
Finally, a number of previous studies have included the effects of marital sta-
tus, race, urban-rural residence, and religiosity in models of trade preferences+ To
61+ Scheve and Slaughter 2001+
62+ We present the results without average annual wage to maximize the sample size, but the
results do not change when this variable is included+
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assess the robustness of our results, we included these variables one at a time and
in combination+ There is no case in which any of these factors strongly influences
trade preferences and including them had no bearing on the remaining results+
Interpreting the Effects of Education
We have found that as Americans obtain more formal education, they become
increasingly likely to prefer free trade+ Most studies have viewed education as a
proxy for skill and therefore interpret findings such as these as supportive of the
factor endowments approach+As noted earlier, Hainmueller and Hiscox have chal-
lenged this interpretation, maintaining that a college education affects trade opin-
ions, above and beyond increasing human capital and skill, by exposing people to
theories about the benefits of trade+63 This exposure, rather than the occupational
skills acquired in the classroom, is why education is positively associated with
preferences for open trade in the United States+ To test their argument, Hainmuel-
ler and Hiscox compared the effects of education ~especially a college education!
on trade attitudes for people in the workforce and for retirees+ If education is a
proxy for skill, they reasoned, the factor endowments approach predicts that it
should have a much greater influence on the trade policy attitudes of people in the
workforce than on retirees+ Their results provided no evidence of this sort; nor do
ours+
First, we added retirees who were included in the NAES survey to our sample of
respondents+ We then added four variables to our model: ~1! an indicator variable
for whether the respondent was retired or in the workforce, and ~2! the interaction
between this variable and some college, college graduate, and graduate
school, respectively+64 ~We dropped average annual wage, export orienta-
tion, import competition, and unemployed since these do not apply to retir-
ees+! Our results indicate that, for any given amount of formal education, the
difference in the predicted value of each dependent variable between individuals in
and out of the workforce is less than three percent+ Clearly, the effects of education
do not vary in any meaningful way between these sets of people+
Second, in order to directly test Hainmueller and Hiscox’s argument, we included
two items on the KN survey+ The first asked whether respondents had taken an
economics course+ The second asked whether economists believe that free trade is
good or bad for the economy+We included the latter item to determine whether an
understanding of the basic principles of international economics affects trade atti-
tudes, regardless of whether someone has taken an economics course+ We then
created two dummy variables+ economics class equals 1 if a respondent has taken
such a course, 0 otherwise+ economists’ view of trade equals 1 if a respondent
63+ Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+
64+ Note that retirees make up about 19 percent of the sample in this analysis+
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understands that economists believe that free trade is good for the economy, 0
otherwise+ If Hainmueller and Hiscox are correct, then the estimated coefficients
of these variables should be positive and statistically significant+ The coefficients
of some college, college graduate, and graduate education, however,
should not be significant+
The results shown in the fifth column of Table 3 provide some support for
Hainmueller and Hiscox’s thesis+ The estimated coefficients of the two variables
tapping exposure to ideas about the benefits of trade are both positive+ econo-
mists’ view of trade has a statistically significant effect, whereas the influence
of economics class is marginally significant ~ p  +105!+ Nonetheless, economic
knowledge has a small impact on trade attitudes: taking an economics class or
understanding that economists argue that free trade is beneficial increases the pre-
dicted value of the KN dependent variable by only 2 to 3 percent, holding con-
stant the remaining variables in the model+ Equally, the estimated coefficients of
some college, college graduate, and graduate school, although some-
what smaller than before, remain jointly significant; and the coefficients of the
latter two variables remain positive and statistically significant+ The impact of
education on trade attitudes stems from far more than a knowledge of basic eco-
nomic principles+
What, then, underlies the influence of education? To gain a better understand-
ing of this issue, we turn to an analysis of noneconomic influences, including eth-
nocentrism, nationalism, and isolationism, indexes drawn from the KN survey
that we described earlier and that are likely to be closely tied to educational attain-
ment+ The effects of these variables are reported in the final column of Table 3+
The coefficient estimates of all three variables are negative, indicating that there
is little support for free trade among people who believe the United States is supe-
rior to other countries, hold isolationist views, and exhibit evidence of prejudice
toward groups unlike themselves+ The effects of isolationist attitudes and ethno-
centrism are statistically significant+ These effects are also relatively large+A change
from the most globally interventionist attitudes registered by respondents to the
most isolationist attitudes reduces the predicted value of our measure of trade atti-
tudes by almost 20 percent+ A shift from the least ethnocentric views to the most
ethnocentric views reduces this predicted value by about 12 percent+ Both of these
changes are statistically significant+
Not only do isolationism and ethnocentrism have a strong bearing on pref-
erences about trade, they also account for the effects of education+ After including
isolationism, ethnocentrism, and nationalism in the model, the estimated coef-
ficients of some college, college graduate, and graduate school become
substantially smaller+ Moreover, none of these coefficients are even close to sta-
tistically significant and they are no longer jointly significant+ The smaller and
weaker effects of education stem from the impact of isolationism and ethno-
centrism, rather than nationalism+ If we exclude isolationism and ethnocen-
trism but include nationalism, the effects of education grow larger and stronger+
In fact, the coefficients of the variables pertaining to education are almost identi-
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cal to the corresponding coefficients in the fifth column of Table 3, a finding that
accords with previous research on the relationship between nationalism and trade
attitudes+65 Consequently, the effects of education reflect differences in attitudes
about the extent to which the United States should take an activist stance in inter-
national affairs and a general tendency to think less of out-groups relative to
in-groups+
At one level, these results might seem curious+Why, for example, does a belief
that the United States should play the role of “world policeman” in preventing
human rights abuses in other countries have anything to do with trade prefer-
ences? Why should how blacks feel about whites and Hispanics ~or vice-versa!
have anything to do with trade liberalization? Activist foreign policy attitudes, a
positive attitude toward out-groups, and a preference for open trade, however, all
reflect a sense of cosmopolitanism and inclusion+ Isolationism, a negative attitude
toward out-groups, and antipathy toward open trade all reflect a sense of insular-
ity and separatism+ In short, trade preferences are driven less by economic consid-
erations and more by an individual’s psychological worldview+
Conclusion
It is widely acknowledged that any complete model of the political economy of
trade must account for the preferences of the mass public+66 These preferences
influence trade policy because government officials need to attend to constituent
interests to retain office+67 Despite the obvious importance of understanding the
factors that influence attitudes about trade, however, there have been only a hand-
ful of studies on this topic+
Much of the research to date emphasizes that trade preferences are shaped by
how overseas commerce affects an individual’s income+ The factor endowments
or Heckscher-Ohlin framework posits that these preferences are affected primarily
by a person’s skills+ In a country such as the United States, highly skilled individ-
uals will benefit economically from open trade and therefore should prefer the
expansion of foreign commerce, while less skilled individuals should oppose it+
The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner framework posits that people who work in
import-competing industries should oppose open trade because foreign competi-
tion is likely to degrade their income and threaten their jobs, whereas those who
are employed in export-oriented industries should support it+
As with most existing studies of attitudes toward trade, we find limited support
for either approach+ Occupational wages, a widely used measure of skill, have no
65+ See O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; and Mayda and Rodrik 2005+ Note that our measure of nation-
alism is virtually identical to the measures used in these earlier studies+
66+ See Rodrik 1995; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; and O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002+
67+ Fordham and McKeown 2003+
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effect on attitudes about trade+ On the other hand, highly educated Americans are
much more likely to support open trade than are less-educated individuals+ Some
previous studies have interpreted this result as support for the factor endowments
approach+ However, we have found that that there is reason to be wary of this
interpretation+ In this study, we conducted the first systematic analysis of the influ-
ence of isolationism and ethnocentrism on trade attitudes+ Our findings reveal that
the observed effects of education reflect negative attitudes toward out-groups, as
well as views about whether U+S+ foreign policy should be isolationist or interven-
tionist+ Isolationism and domestic ethnocentrism are strongly linked to hostility
toward free trade+ People who have less formal education also hold more negative
attitudes toward those different from themselves+ Although there are several theo-
ries as to how and why education increases tolerance and promotes more cosmo-
politan worldviews, there is little doubt that these factors are closely linked+ After
accounting for the effects of isolationism and ethnocentrism, we find that educa-
tion has no direct effect on trade attitudes, thus suggesting that its effects repre-
sent out-group anxiety rather than economic self-interest+
In addition, we find no support for the specific factors approach+ The revealed
comparative ~dis!advantage of the industry in which an individual is employed
does not influence his or her opinions in the way that this approach predicts+ Nor
does the tariff level of the industry in which he or she works+ In short, despite our
efforts to gather detailed information on industry of employment and on individ-
ual skill levels, the self-interest hypothesis has little explanatory power when it
comes to understanding attitudes toward trade+
Besides out-group anxiety, we find that opinions on trade are driven by percep-
tions of trade’s impact on the nation as a whole+ While at one level this finding
may seem obvious, because existing studies have emphasized that trade prefer-
ences are shaped by self-interest, they have largely ignored the influence of the
information that drives perceptions of trade’s collective-level impact on the nation+
We argue that this oversight is a significant shortcoming+Americans’ attitudes about
trade are guided in powerful ways by whether they believe that trade harms or
benefits the national economy, and this perception is not a mere extension of their
personal self-interest+ If sociotropic perceptions were merely personal interests pro-
jected onto the country at large, then we would not expect the impact of percep-
tions to be consistently strong and influential in shaping trade attitudes in models
that simultaneously demonstrate little, if any, impact from indicators of objective
self-interest+
The fact that sociotropic perceptions powerfully shape trade attitudes begs the
question of where these perceptions originate+ Although a thorough analysis of
this question is beyond the scope of this study, scholars studying the origins of
sociotropic perceptions in other economic policy arenas have identified three likely
sources+ First, many have found that mass media coverage of the economy plays
an important role in forming these perceptions+ To the extent that negative eco-
nomic indicators and downturns are stressed in press coverage, perceptions of the
economy also tend to become more negative, regardless of whether people are
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personally experiencing these downturns+68 Likewise, when unemployment is
emphasized in local and national media, individuals’ perceptions of the state of
unemployment also become more negative+69 Any tendency for the press to place
greater emphasis on the harmful impact of trade and less emphasis on the benefi-
cial impact might help to account for the negatively skewed sociotropic percep-
tions shown in Figure 1+
In addition to mass media, local economic conditions that individuals learn about
through interpersonal contact and casual conversations also influence their percep-
tions of the direction of national economic change+Although evidence is less exten-
sive on this point, even those individuals who are not personally affected by trade
policies can form impressions of its impact based on acquaintances who have been
personally influenced+70 In the case of trade, formal coursework in economics and
related disciplines may also shape perceptions of whether trade is good or bad for
the U+S+ economy+ Finally, perceptions of national-level conditions could be affected
by personal experience, although most available evidence suggests that this rela-
tionship is fairly weak since people tend to compartmentalize personal-level and
collective-level information+71 Overall, our findings suggest that a better under-
standing of trade preferences among the mass public requires that we account for
the broader information environment in which policy attitudes are formed, as well
as the psychological predispositions of individuals+
The strong implication of our study is that standard political economy models
are limited in what they can explain about trade preferences+ Self-interest accounts
for at best only a small portion of the variance in attitudes about trade+ Incorpo-
rating the effects of sociotropic perceptions, isolationism, and out-group anxiety
substantially increases the explanatory power of models of such attitudes+ These
results conform to what public opinion research has shown about how people form
economic policy preferences more generally+ Moreover, they point to the need for
studies of trade policy to focus more attention on the development of psycholog-
ically informed models addressing how people process economic information, and
whether political leaders are accurately held accountable for the effects of trade
policies+
In one sense our findings were foreshadowed by research almost half a century
ago, although this approach did not become dominant in explaining trade prefer-
ences+ As early as 1963, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter noted that education’s impor-
tance in shaping attitudes toward foreign trade in the United States exceeded even
that of the economic characteristics of a respondent+72 Unfortunately, they lacked
the kind of specific information we have accumulated on individual skill levels
68+ See, for example, Adoni and Cohen 1978; Erbring, Goldenberg, and Miller 1980; MacKuen and
Coombs 1981; and Behr and Iyengar 1985+
69+ Mutz 1992+
70+ Conover, Feldman, and Knight 1986+
71+ See Tyler 1980 and 1984; and Tyler and Cook 1984+
72+ Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963+
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and industries, and thus they could not differentiate between various explanations
as to why education was so influential+ These same scholars were also prescient in
recognizing the role of communications in shaping perceptions of trade’s impact,
noting that press coverage in the 1950s was probably what changed public percep-
tions of whether trade was beneficial for the country+ Finally, Bauer, Pool, and
Dexter argued, as we have, that attitudes toward trade were driven in part by more
general attitudes toward isolationism and internationalism+73
The implications of out-group anxiety for trade policy are particularly worri-
some because anxiety toward out-groups is such a widespread reaction to what is
unfamiliar+ Although our findings are limited to a sample of Americans, we sus-
pect that they generalize to other nations as well, precisely because fear of outsid-
ers is so commonplace+ Although the structure of economies differs greatly from
country to country, human psychology tends to cross national borders easily+ The
origins of ethnocentric worldviews have been extensively studied, thus enabling
some understanding of its origins+
Moreover, our findings may help to explain why previous studies have found
that education is positively associated with support for trade liberalization, even
in countries in which skilled labor is a scarce factor+74 To the extent that education
promotes cosmopolitanism and reduces out-group anxiety, its effects should be in
the same direction in a wide variety of countries+ Future approaches to explaining
trade preferences will inevitably need to integrate the impact of information about
how trade is perceived to affect the economy as well as the symbolic, psycholog-
ical threat posed by U+S+ involvement in foreign markets+
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